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Summary 
This paper studies the impacts of introducing the regulation of carbon-dioxide 
emission trading in the power market. The main point of regulation is to turn carbon-
dioxide emissions into a tradable commodity, as a way of encouraging enterprises to 
reduce their emission levels. A number of different scenarios covering the 
development of market conditions will be outlined and examined, basically for two 
types of effects: the change in power market prices, and the expected state revenue. 
The supply of power will be described by a stepped curve that expresses both 
the different operating costs of the various generating capacities, and their output 
capacities. Demand comprises a liberalised and a captive segment. The prices in the 
latter segment are regulated by decrees. The impact of the regulation of emission 
trading on the power market can be reviewed through alteration of the supply curve. 
According to the model, the enterprises decide on the amounts they will 
invest in reducing their emissions and on the proportion of their emission permits 
(allowances) to be sold, taking account of the expected cost of a unit reduction in 
their own carbon-dioxide emissions (marginal abatement cost), the market price of 
electricity, and the price of the pollution permit (allowance). A dozen versions of the 
model are produced on the basis of such external factors as the European CO2 
allowance price, the import power price and the natural gas price and how they 
develop. 
The regulation specified in the National Allocation Plan of 8 October 2004 – 
which includes auctioning 2.5% of the allowances – is assessed in the model. The 
price of electricity increases substantially as a consequence of regulation only if the 
allowance price exceeds €10/t. A high allowance price would result in prices on the 
domestic power market being 3–6% higher than they would be without regulation. 
At the same time, in each model version the carbon-dioxide emissions of domestic 
enterprises are substantially lower in 2010 than the level expected without 
regulation. 
The revenue accruing to the state from auctioning the quotas would be 
between HUF 0.3 billion and HUF 1.0 billion in the group of power plants under 
review during the period between 2005 and 2007, if the allowance price falls between 
€3 and €10/t. The budget could earn an additional HUF 2–11 billion per year by 
auctioning the part of the quantity of allowances that, under the existing allocation 
plan, would be distributed free of charge over and above current actual emissions 
(the over-allocated part). 
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Introduction 
This study presents an analysis of the effects of the carbon-dioxide emission 
trading regulation introduced under European Union directive No. 87/2003/EC, on 
the domestic power market. Our assessment of the effects on the power market 
covers both the change in the position of the power generators, and the effects as 
perceived by electricity consumers.  
The first section of this paper contains a description of the model we have 
developed to explore the issue. To analyse the impact of CO2 regulation we have 
carried out a series of calculations in a static partial equilibrium model. One set of 
calculations explored the relationships between supply and demand in the power 
market, and another assessed the effects of CO2 regulation.  
The second section of the study presents twelve different scenarios based on 
different values assigned to the market and the regulatory model variables we regard 
as important, as well as a discussion of the observed effects on the power market, 
comparing these to the basic models without CO2 regulation. 
This study is closely related to the paper entitled ‘Theoretical foundations and 
EU regulation of carbon-dioxide emission trading’ published in March 2005 as the 
11th Working Papers of the Hungarian Ministry of Finance. Therefore, this study will 
not contain any discussion of the theoretical foundations underlying our calculations, 
since these are detailed in our previous paper. 
1. Description of the model 
1.1 Assessment of the operation of the power market  
The operation of the electricity market can be modelled on the basis of the so-
called load distribution algorithm, in which the operator of the power system loads 
the production capacities (which generate power for the network) available in the 
power network in an order that corresponds to the changing operating costs of the 
various production capacities, to cover the demand for power at any given point in 
time. Supply in the power market may be described in a simplified way using a 
stepped curve, where the various steps are determined by the output capabilities of 
the various generating capacities and the variable costs of their operation (Bach, P. F. 
(2003), Paul, A. and D. Burtraw (2002), North, M. et al. (2002), Hogan, W. W. (1993)). 
The stepped supply curve is based on an assumption that the various power 
generator sets are capable of generating power at constant variable costs across the 
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whole interval of their capacity.1 The in-built capacity of a power plant determines 
the maximum possible output, while the variable cost per kWh that is characteristic 
of any given power plant unit can be calculated on the basis of the technology of the 
generator set, its technical features and fuel consumption (or efficiency). The 
following figure shows the relationships between supply and demand in the power 
market.  
Figure 1. Trend of market equilibrium in the case of a stepped supply curve  
 
 
The so-called ‘merit order dispatch’ scheme places the production units in its 
schedule according to their variable costs to ensure the demand for power is met at 
any point in time, i.e. it is assumed that the market will always choose the least 
expensive capacity available. The variable cost of the last power generator set still 
involved in meeting demand determines the free-market price.  
                                                 
1 Though it is not entirely true that the cost of generation does not change with output, since, using the 
power plant characteristics curves that describe the heat consumption characteristics as a function of 
the load on the unit, it is possible to identify an optimum load for each set, where the unit operates at 
the lowest unit heat consumption (Balogh and Bihari, 2002). At the level of abstraction required for 
modelling, however, the assumption of a constant average variable cost that corresponds to the 
marginal cost is sufficiently close to reality. 
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Under the 2001 legislation on electricity (Act No. 2001/CX), 1 January 2003 
saw the start of the liberalisation of the power market, which had hitherto been 
operating exclusively in the form of a captive system of power supply. Liberalisation 
of the power industry is to proceed gradually, and until 2007 at least there will be 
two markets operating under different conditions – the captive segment and the 
liberalised power market. Accordingly, during the period under review, demand will 
be made up of a captive segment and a free-market segment. In our calculations, and 
in line with the trends observed over recent years, liberalisation of the market 
proceeds rather more slowly than under the scenario of market liberalisation 
outlined in EU Directive 2003/54/EC. Our calculations are based on the following 
schedule of market liberalisation:  
Table 1. Size of the free-market segment 
Year Proportion of 
consumption in the 
free market  
2002 0% 
2003 18% 
2004 22% 
2005 25% 
2006 30% 
2007 35% 
2008 40% 
2009 50% 
2010 60% 
2011 75% 
 Source: authors’ estimate.  
Demand in the captive sector is determined on the basis of projections, and the 
prices applied are the regulated tariffs published in the decrees issued by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs from time to time, separately for the various industrial 
and household consumer groups (Power Act No. 2001/CX). In 2003 GKI (Economic 
Research Institute) was commissioned by MAVIR (Hungarian Power System 
Operator Company) to produce a power demand projection (MAVIR, 2003) to be 
used in the medium and long-term capacity planning for the Hungarian electricity 
system. Data from the projection are used in our modelling exercise to predict the 
growth in demand in the captive segment. According to the GKI projection for 
MAVIR, the peak load on the power system will increase by an average of 1.8% per 
year over the next decade. Accordingly, a 1.8% rate of growth in the demand for 
power in the captive segment is used in our calculations.  
Exponential demand curves were used to predict demand for power in the 
free market. This made it possible to take into account the price sensitivity of 
consumers, too, in the free-market segment. A short- and medium-term feature of the 
power market is its low degree of demand–price flexibility. In view of the lack of 
relevant Hungarian predictions, the price flexibility data required to establish free-
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market demand were estimated on the basis of international technical literature.2 As 
for the demand–price flexibility of household consumers in the power market, we 
used data provided by the social research institute TÁRKI (2003). For industrial 
consumers and for household consumers we assumed a -0.25 and a -0.15 price 
flexibility factor, respectively. The demand for power at any given point in time 
equals the sum of the captive and free-market demand established for that point in 
time.  
Demand in the captive market is met by capacities committed to the captive 
regime up to an amount set for any given year.3 The gradual growth of the free 
market is accompanied by a corresponding shrinking of the captive market, and the 
captive capacities that are not loaded in the public utility operations, as well as the 
capacities without long-term contracts, are involved in the free-market load 
distribution in an increasing order according to their variable costs.  
The effects of CO2 regulation on the power market can be assessed from the 
way the supply curve shifts. Since the inverse power market supply curve is 
determined by the amount of power, which in turn is determined by the unit cost of 
generation and the capacities available at the various power plants, the changes in 
these values that result from the introduction of regulation need to be analysed in 
order to explore the effects of CO2 trading on the power market.  
1.2 Corporate decisions relating to carbon-dioxide regulation  
Since the goal of the EU regulation aimed at reducing the emission of 
greenhouse gases is to stimulate enterprises into reducing their emissions, our 
calculation model is based on the assumption that enterprises participating in 
emission trading will decide on the possibilities of investment projects relating to 
abatement and/or on the sale or purchase of emission permits, based on their own 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves and the power price and CO2 allowance price 
(both factors determined externally). 
In order to model the decisions to be made by companies, we looked at the 
abatement options available to the operators of the various initial power plant 
technologies. Using the unit CO2 emission ratios, emission reduction potentials and 
investment costs of the various power plant technologies, we summed up the 
technological options that entailed CO2 reduction. On the basis of this we can 
observe the unit cost increases needed to reduce the CO2 emission levels of the 
various power plant technologies to various specific levels.  
                                                 
2 Donnelly, W. A. (1987) The Econometrics of Energy Demand : a survey of applications, Praeger, New 
York. 
3 The amount of capacity committed to public utility purposes was estimated on the basis of Horváth 
(2004), in BKAE, Rekk (2004). 
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In identifying the abatement options, we considered the following three 
possible ways of reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) that are available to fossil fuel 
generators: 1) efficiency improvement; 2) change of fuel; 3) end-of-pipe abatement.4 
Our model involves a variety of abatement options for power plants that use 
different fuels and different generation technologies. A solution from among the 
abatement options contained within the model may be achieved by altering the 
parameters in the model to take account of the individual features of each power 
plant involved in our analysis. 
In the case of coal-burning power plants the following abatement options are 
contained within our model: a) simple pulverised coal combustion (PCC – the basic 
set-up); b) atmospheric fluidised bed combustion (AFBC); c) pressurised fluid bed 
combustion (PFBC), d) a technology that gasifies solid fuel and then uses it for 
combined gas and steam cycle power generation, that is Integrated Gasification Gas 
Combined Cycles (IGCC). The use of e) a high surface area heat exchanger that offers 
an improvement in the recovery of the caloric energy of the flue gas was included as 
an abatement technique that does not necessitate any change in the basic technology, 
along with f) pre-drying of the coal using a fluid bed heated using a steam-heated 
piping system. Switching the fuel offers two more options: introduction of biomass 
or natural gas-based combustion. Various solid fuel combustion techniques are 
available if biomass is used. If the plant switches to natural gas, then a complete 
technology change is possible even with the use of a simple steam cycle system: 
investment in open or combined cycle gas turbine technology is among the available 
options.  
In the case of hydrocarbon-burning power plants, CO2 emissions may be 
reduced by altering the relative proportions of fuel oil and natural gas, or by 
introducing gas turbine technology (open or combined cycle) in place of the steam 
cycle. 
After assessing a number of options (CO2 absorption by membrane, chemical 
or physical overcooling) we decided to take into account only the end-of-pipe 
technology with the lowest unit cost. This is the MEA scrubber, based on the 
technique of spraying monoethanolamine into the flue gas and then mechanically 
separating the precipitation formed with the CO2. Each end-of-pipe technology 
entails an increase in the consumption of energy for the operation of the power plant 
and a consequent deterioration in the overall efficiency of operation, resulting in a 
significant increase in the total cost of power output. 
It is assumed that power plants decide on the various alternative options for 
investment on the basis of the discounted cash flow over the life cycle of a given 
                                                 
4 The sources of the abatement marginal cost curves we built up include the power plant technology 
descriptions and cost data published in international technical literature, along with the CO2 database 
of IIASA, which contains the investment and operation parameters of operational and experimental 
power plants that utilise the various available technologies, along with the associated costs. A 
complete list of the sources is presented at the end of this study. 
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technology based on an estimated CO2 allowance and an estimated electricity price 
(also taking account of the expenditure and revenue relating to CO2 regulation). To 
calculate cash flows, the future cash movements on the revenue and the expenditure 
sides were identified in relation to each technological step, for one kW of output. The 
items on the expenditure side included the one-off specific investment cost incurred 
in the first year, the fixed and the various operating and maintenance costs, the fuel 
costs and the cost of allowance purchase, if any. The revenue may come from the 
planned sale of power and from the sale of allowance, if any.  
Modelling is based on real values, net of the effects of inflation. The external 
factors of the European power sale price and the CO2 allowance price in the period 
concerned may be specified in order to calculate revenue and costs. The algorithm 
chosen for our analyses uses the power output (in kW) that corresponds to the pre-
estimated capacity actually available for a given technology. The power plants make 
their choice from the available options before the period of regulation, but after CO2 
regulation comes into force. The model takes account of the unit costs and capacity 
utilisation rates characteristic of the new technology, from the year the investment 
project concerned is completed.  
The enterprises’ own fuel composition5 is used as input data, from which the 
model calculates the CO2 emissions using the emission factors determined by the 
IPCC.6 The quantity so allocated, and the principle of allocation, can be freely 
defined in the model. The calculated necessary output quantity can also be freely 
restricted and the auctioned percentage may also be freely set. Besides auctioning, an 
emission- or output-based allocation mechanism may be chosen. As will be described 
in detail below, in the course of our calculations we built the latest effective 
allocation data of the Hungarian National Allocation Plan into the model.  
On the basis of the technology parameters applied, together with a given CO2 
price and the mode of allocation, it is possible to calculate whether each and every 
power plant will have a surplus or a shortfall of allowance in a given year. The value 
of the calculated allowance surplus/deficit (expressed in HUF) is added to the unit 
cost of generation and will alter the shape of the supply curve. The various 
technological options may influence even the amount of the available capacity. The 
available capacity and variable cost data that characterise the stepped supply curve 
of power generators are modified in our model, depending on the technologies 
chosen by the various generators and the allowance price. By seeking and identifying 
the new equilibrium price in the market, we identify the power price and 
consumption data that are characteristic of a given assessment scenario. The 
development of equilibrium in the market is shown in the following figure. The 
values C1 and C2 and Q1, Q2, as well as C’1 and C’2 and Q’1, Q’2 show the unit costs of 
                                                 
5 MEH [Hungarian Energy Office] (2002) Villamos energia statisztikai évkönyv [Electricity statistics year 
book], 2002. 
6 IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Good Practice Guide and Uncertainty Management 
in National Greenhouse Gas Inventory , http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gp/pdf/2_Energy.pdf  
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the two least expensive power generator sets and their output (kWh) with and 
without the introduction of regulation. 
 
Figure 2. Change of the equilibrium in the market as a result of CO2 regulation  
 
 
1.3 The basic settings of the input data for our calculations  
The following exogenous variables were set in the model: 
• European CO2 allowance price: The data presented above are based on 
allowance prices of €3, €5 and €10. 
• Import price of electricity: The European price of power and the sale price of 
imported power used in our calculations for investments is €30 per MWh, 
which was a typical benchmark price on the EEX (European energy exchange) 
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in 2004. In order to take account of the potential price-driving effect of CO2 
trading, the futures benchmark prices were taken into account:7  
 
Table 2. The futures European power price (benchmark) taken into account in the calculations  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EUR/kWh 0.0345 0.0348 0.0354 0.0377 0.0385 0.0394 
HUF/kWh 8.65 8.73 8.88 9.45 9.65 9.88 
 
• Change in the price of natural gas: As a consequence of CO2 regulation the 
proportion of gas-fired power generation will probably increase at the expense 
of coal- fired technologies, among both Hungarian and broader European 
power plants. No reliable estimate is available on the change in the price of 
gas. According to some experts, the gas price increase resulting from carbon 
regulation may be partially offset by a gas price reduction that is anticipated 
in the wake of the future liberalisation of the gas markets across Europe. The 
model allows a percentage rate of gas price increase to be set, which will have 
an effect both on the choice of abatement technology and the unit cost of 
generation at gas-fired power plants. In this assessment we used a 0% and a 
15% gas price increase.  
• Discount factor: The discount rate required for calculations concerning 
investments is set at 10% in our model, on the assumption that this is the 
discount rate at which investors expect their investments to pay off during the 
life cycle of the technology.  
 
Additional important comments:  
• Other Hungarian power plants include smaller-capacity units of combined 
power and heat generation, along with capacities that use renewable fuels and 
fall within the scope of compulsory power purchase according to Decree No. 
56/2002 GKM of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
• Guaranteed purchase is assumed for the power output that corresponds to the 
actual available capacity of the Oroszlány power plant (126 MW).  
                                                 
7 The European power prices are based on price data of the Frankfurt EEX concerning current 
benchmark and futures transactions (2005–2010).  
www.eex.de/futures_market/market_data/intraday_table_print_e.asp?type=2004.08.02  (date of 
query: 02 August 2004, 14:20).  
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• The capacity of units I and II of the Mátra power plant fixed by MVM Partners 
is considered as contracted capacity for the period 2005–2010.  
• The contracted import capacities of MVM (ATEL, EGL, SYSTEM) are given 
priority in load distribution. 
• To ensure comparability of annual results, the available capacity of the units 
of the nuclear power plant at Paks was set as ‘fully available’ in both 2003 and 
2004.  
1.4 National Allocation Plan 
There are currently two known versions of the National Allocation Plan, and 
at the time both of writing and of drawing up the modelling scenarios the Hungarian 
government’s proposal for the initial allocation of CO2 emission allowances 
according to the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) had not been finalised. The first 
version of the National Allocation Plan was published on 20 September 2004, and the 
second version was dated 8 October. The National Allocation Plan contains sectoral 
total allowance quantities, along with quantities of allowances at facility level, to be 
allocated free of charge. The power plants covered by our study are licensable power 
generators, and accordingly the individual emission allowance quantities pertaining 
to such generators are listed in sector ‘I/a’ of the National Allocation Plan for years 
2005, 2006 and 2007. (Sector I/a constitutes the licensable generators in the scheme of 
the Hungarian Energy Office.) 
Besides the free individual emission allowances, the National Allocation Plan 
also provides for allowance quantities to be auctioned in each branch. In the version 
dated 20 September the figure for this was 1%, while in the 8 October version of the 
National Allocation Plan it was 2.5%. 
The following table presents a summary of the quantities of allowances that 
may be allocated free of charge to power plants covered by our model, as detailed in 
the two versions of the National Allocation Plan (NAP). There is obviously little 
difference between the quantities of the total allowances in the two versions, but 
there is a rearrangement in the allocation of the allowances. 
 
Table 3. The CO2 allowances that may be allocated free of charge under the National 
Allocation Plan to power plants covered by this study (in tonnes) 
 20 September 8 October 
 
2005-6-7 
each year 
over three 
years 
total 
2005-6-7 
each year 
over three 
years 
total 
Bánhida 94 126 282 378 93 706 281 118 
Oroszlány 1 309 329 3 927 987 1 303 487 3 910 461 
Dunam. II 1 401 796 4 205 388 1 395 541 4 186 623 
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Dunam. GT1 658 958 1 976 874 677 011 2 031 033 
Dunam. GT2 683 422 2 050 266 702 144 2 106 432 
Mátra I-V 6 419 736 19 259 208 6 229 697 18 689 091 
Tisza II 1 526 109 4 578 327 1 519 300 4 557 900 
Tiszap. I-III 532 797 1 598 391 530 420 1 591 260 
Csepel GT 846 767 2 540 301 869 965 2 609 895 
Pécs IV-V 260 787 782 361 351 246 1 053 738 
Újpest+Kispest 622 748 1 868 244 639 808 1 919 424 
Kelenföld GT 296 625 889 875 304 751 914 253 
Debrecen GT 313 294 939 882 321 877 965 631 
total 14 966 494 44 899 482 14 938 953 44 816 859 
other power 
plants 540 515 1 621 545 917 319 2 751 957 
altogether 15 572 224 46 716 672 15 856 272 47 568 816 
Notes: 
Other power plants include: AES Borsodi Energetikai Kft – Kazincbarcikai Erőmű fossil fuel 
units; Bakonyi Erőmű Rt – Ajkai Erőmű; Budapesti Erőmű Rt – Kőbányai Erőmű; the power 
plant of EMA-Power Rt; G-TER – Litér, Lőrinci, Sajószöged power plants and, according to 
the 20 September version, Bakonyi Erőmű Rt – Inotai Erőmű; and Vértesi Erőmű Rt – 
Tatabányai Erőmű.  
The total power output of the power plants covered by our calculations also includes the 
power output of small power plants produced as cogeneration and bought up under the 
compulsory purchase arrangement. This group of power plants is included in our 
calculations only in aggregate, for they are not included among the licensable generators in 
the scheme of the Hungarian Energy Office, and accordingly, instead of sector I/a of the 
NAP, they are included in sectors I/b or I/c. 
 
Other power plants and heating facilities that generate power in combination 
with caloric energy for heating (steam and hot water supply) in a district are listed in 
sector I/b of the NAP, rather than I/a sector. Combustion facilities whose output is 
consumed by their operators are listed in sector I/c. 
Our model calculations were carried out using the free individual power plant 
emission caps and an auctioned proportion of 2.5%, as specified in the 8 October 2004 
version of the NAP. Accordingly, we can also present the effects of the latest version 
of the National Allocation Plan. To assess these regulatory arrangements we 
developed 10 different model versions by altering the parameters of three important 
variables within the model. These three model variables are: the average end-user 
price of natural gas, the average import price of power, and the average market price 
of CO2 emission allowance.  
Natural gas plays a major role in power generation in Hungary: as a fossil fuel 
it is practically equal in importance to coal. It is expected to grow in importance, not 
only as power plants switch fuels, but also in view of the choice of fuel of capacities 
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yet to be built. While the types of coal used in power generation in Hungary are raw 
materials that originate from integrated individual mines owned by the generators, 
natural gas is a product purchased on the market and is thus more exposed to market 
influences. Two versions were applied with respect to the end-user price of natural 
gas. One assumes the maintenance of the existing price level in real terms, while the 
other assumes a natural gas price level some 15% above the price level during the 
period under review.8  
As a result of the gradual liberalisation of the power market, imported 
electricity will play an increasing role in domestic supply and, consequently, in the 
development of power prices in Hungary. As was outlined above, two power import 
price scenarios were used in our model calculations. The difference between them is 
that one assumed no change in the price of imported power, while the other assumed 
an increasing import price.  
For the market price of CO2 emission allowances we used three parameter 
values. The third quarter of 2004 was characterised primarily by a small volume of 
forward transactions on the European carbon market, with typical contract prices of 
around €8/t.9 Therefore, our results are examined on the basis of an allowance price 
of €5 and €10/t. However, according to the national allocation plans submitted to the 
European Commission and the responses of the Commission so far, demand is 
expected to be lower than originally expected, since the majority of the national 
governments did not apply strict basic principles to establish the total quantities to 
be allocated.10 For this reason, our results will also be assessed on the basis of a much 
lower than expected allowance price of €3/t CO2. 
By altering the parameter values of the different versions of the model, a total 
of twelve different model versions were developed. Accordingly, a total of fourteen 
different model versions have been compiled in this study, including the basic 
scenarios pertaining to the ‘business as usual’ (BAU; gaz0BAU; gaz15BAU) scenarios 
                                                 
8 The expectations concerning the domestic price of natural gas vary widely according to the weights 
assigned to the various conditions and the expected extent of their changes. Natural gas is not a mass 
commodity in the traditional commodity exchange meaning of the term, and therefore its price may 
vary widely in a given region, depending on the agreements between the enterprises involved in 
production, transport and distribution, as well as between traders and groups of consumers. At 
present, the price level in the domestic category of large consumers is similar to the average large 
consumer price level prevailing in the EU, and both effects that depress and effects that increase the 
prices are expected to influence the development of the gas price. The consistently high oil price may 
drive a price increase, while deregulation of the natural gas market may reduce prices, since the 
gradual liberalisation of the market may result in more favourable terms than those offered by the 
captive market supply contracts for a significant percentage of large consumers as well. 
9 Data on individual transactions and aggregate market information:  www.pointcarbon.com; regular 
downloads.   
10 The national allocation plans submitted by the member states and the versions accepted by the 
Commission are accessible on the home page of the EU Environment Directorate General. Downloads: 
October 2004;  http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm  
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without CO2 regulation.11 The following table provides an overview of the model 
versions assessed in our study. 
Table 4. The variables modified in the course of modelling, and their parameters, the model 
versions so assessed and the titles of the various scenarios in the study  
  Average import power price 
  fixed current real price according to futures contract prices on the power exchange 
  Change in natural gas price level  Change in natural gas price level 
  0% + 15% 0% + 15% 
3 3€-gaz0imall 3€-gaz15imall 3€-gaz0imfut 3€-gaz15imfut 
5 5€-gaz0imall 5€-gaz15imall 5€-gaz0imfut 5€-gaz15imfut 
CO2 allowance 
market price, 
€/t 
10 10€-gaz0imall 10€-gaz15imall 10€-gaz0imfut 10€-gaz15imfut 
 
The following is an overview of the results of the various modelling scenarios.  
2. The results of modelling  
2.1 Models based on unchanged gas prices  
Leaving aside the case without CO2 regulation, these models show that the 
way the price of imported power develops will have a greater impact on marginal 
costs in the domestic free-market power system than the introduction of CO2 
emission trading. If the power price remains stable in Europe despite the 
introduction of CO2 trading by the European Union (in the case of an allowance price 
of €3 or €5/t  this is a realistic assumption, particularly in view of the substantial 
imports from non-EU member states such as the Ukraine and Romania), then the 
marginal costs of the power system will not change substantially in comparison to 
the marginal costs without the introduction of CO2 regulation. A free-market price 
slightly higher than the BAU will develop only in the case of an allowance price of 
€10/t, which – assuming that import prices remain unchanged – will mean that the 
€10/t CO2 cost to domestic generators will increase the costs of a marginal generator. 
If the price of power available from imports does remain stable, this could be a result 
of the effect of the dominant role of CO2-neutral nuclear energy or of deregulation in 
Europe. The increasing liberalisation of the market, however, means that the import 
                                                 
11 The import price of electricity is set as ‘fixed at the current price level’ in the models without 
regulation (BAU), i.e. there is no BAU version with increasing power price, for any growth in power 
prices is associated with the introduction of CO2 regulation at the European Union level. 
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capacities will not cover the increased demand for free-market capacities, and as a 
consequence the domestic price at an allowance cost of €10 will diverge from the 
BAU, the €3 and the €5 versions.  
If, however, despite the unchanged gas prices the introduction of CO2 
regulation in Europe is accompanied by a growth in imported power prices by a 
percentage that is taken into account now in futures transactions, the domestic free-
market price will significantly exceed the price without CO2 regulation, since the 
price of power available from imports will also be higher and, as a result of the 
higher import price, power plants that generate electricity at higher costs will also 
come to be involved in Hungarian power generation. 
Table 5. The development of the free-market price of power in the case of different CO2 
allowance prices, unchanged gas price, unchanged and growing import power prices, 
HUF/kWh 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BAU 7.68 7.70 7.85 7.90 8.13 8.45 8.88 9.52 10.02 10.33 
In the case of unchanged import power price  
€3/t CO2 7.68 7.70 7.85 7.92 8.20 8.52 9.00 9.52 10.07 10.36 
€5/t CO2 7.68 7.70 7.85 7.92 8.20 8.55 9.04 9.53 10.05 10.37 
€10/t CO2 7.68 7.70 7.88 8.08 8.39 9.02 9.57 10.01 10.37 10.69 
In the case of growing import power price 
€3/t CO2 7.68 7.70 8.74 8.76 9.00 9.57 9.79 10.07 10.19 10.39 
€5/t CO2 7.68 7.70 8.74 8.76 9.00 9.57 9.79 10.07 10.19 10.39 
€10/t CO2 7.68 7.70 8.77 8.87 9.11 9.66 9.93 10.24 10.48 10.74 
 
Clearly, in the case of stable import prices, by 2007 the introduction of CO2 
regulation will have led to no change in the domestic prices on the free market, if the 
CO2 allowance price is €3 or €5/t. Even in the case of a €10 allowance price there 
would only be a 3% price increase on the free market. However, an import price 
growth caused by the introduction of CO2 regulation would result in at least a 10% 
price increase on the free market. 
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Figure 3. Trend of the free-market price of power along with unchanged gas prices and import 
prices, as a result of different CO2 allowance prices  
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Figure 4. Trend of the free-market price of power along with unchanged gas prices and 
increasing import prices, as a result of different CO2 allowance prices  
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Consumption will develop accordingly. The share of price-sensitive 
consumption will increase as a consequence of the growth of the free-market 
segment. This leads to a gradual divergence of the scenarios. 
 18
 
Table 6. Development of annual net consumption in the case of unchanged gas prices, 
unchanged or increasing import power prices and different CO2 allowance prices, in GWh 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BAU 33710 34687 35672 36744 37805 38773 39674 40274 40646 40857 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10255 12652 15052 17387 21463 25341 31052 31090 
In the case of unchanged import power price 
€3/t CO2  33710 34687 35672 36737 37767 38699 39538 40171 40531 40746 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10255 12646 15014 17314 21326 25238 30936 30979 
€5/t CO2  33710 34687 35672 36737 37764 38682 39498 40132 40520 40737 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10255 12646 15012 17297 21286 25199 30925 30970 
€10/t CO2  33710 34687 35664 36673 37629 38328 38898 39337 39684 39867 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10247 12582 14876 16943 20686 24404 30089 30100 
In the case of growing  import power price 
€3/t CO2  33710 34687 35362 36150 36936 37522 38167 38760 39417 39922 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10255 12646 15014 17314 21326 25238 30936 30979 
€5/t CO2  33710 34687 35362 36150 36936 37522 38167 38760 39417 39922 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10255 12646 15012 17297 21286 25199 30925 30970 
€10/t CO2  33710 34687 35354 36110 36862 37423 38006 38528 39009 39347 
of which free 
market 6571 8598 10247 12582 14876 16943 20686 24404 30089 30100 
Note: 
Self-consumption of power plants and network losses are not included in the net 
consumption figure. 
 
The following figures show that, as a consequence of the increase in prices and 
the growth of price-flexible consumption, the rate of consumption growth declines in 
each scenario, just as it does without CO2 regulation. Not surprisingly, the fastest 
decline in the rate of growth is expected in the case of an allowance price of €10/t, 
but this scenario also reveals an interesting finding that the introduction of CO2 
regulation has no effect on power consumption if import prices are stable and the 
secondary market price of CO2 allowances does not exceed €5/t. In the case of higher 
import prices, consumption is reduced even if the allowance prices are lower. 
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Figure 5. Trend of annual consumption in the case of unchanged gas prices, unchanged 
import power prices and different CO2 allowance prices  
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Figure 6. Trend of annual consumption in the case of unchanged gas prices, increasing 
import power prices and different CO2 allowance prices  
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2.2 Models involving increasing gas prices 
In another set of model versions the price of imported power is presented in two 
versions, just as above: in one alternative it is stabilised at the current price level, 
while in the other it grows gradually (as described above). The price of natural gas, 
however, is 15% higher throughout the period under review.  
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Table 7. Trend of free-market power price in the case of different CO2 allowance prices, 
increasing gas price and standard or increasing import power prices, HUF/kWh 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BAU 7.68 7.92 8.12 8.79 9.10 9.44 9.86 9.96 10.16 10.38 
Unchanged import power price 
€3/t CO2 7.68 7.92 8.12 8.87 9.18 9.53 9.87 10.02 10.23 10.48 
€5/t CO2 7.68 7.92 8.12 8.92 9.23 9.54 9.88 10.03 10.22 10.48 
€10/t CO2 7.68 7.92 8.14 9.35 9.59 9.79 10.06 10.26 10.54 10.82 
Growing import power price 
€3/t CO2 7.68 7.92 8.76 9.01 9.28 9.79 10.01 10.13 10.27 10.51 
€5/t CO2 7.68 7.92 8.76 9.06 9.31 9.78 10.01 10.13 10.27 10.51 
€10/t CO2 7.68 7.92 8.77 9.41 9.64 9.97 10.14 10.30 10.56 10.84 
 
Following the introduction of CO2 regulation, and given stable import prices, 
by 2007 the domestic price on the free market will be about 1% higher than if there 
were no regulation, provided the CO2 allowance price does not exceed €3 or €5/t; if 
the allowance price equals €10/t the figure will be 5%. In the version with constant 
gas prices the figures will be 0% and 3%, respectively. An increase in import prices 
alongside the introduction of CO2 regulation will mean that by 2007 prices on the 
free market will be about 2% higher than if there were no regulation, provided the 
allowance price does not exceed €5/t. The increase in the price of electricity will be 
6% above the BAU level if the CO2 allowance price is €10/t, which is less than the 
10% price increase we saw irrespective of CO2 allowance prices in model versions 
with stable gas prices and growing import electricity prices. The reason for this is 
that the basic model with an unchanged gas price, which assesses the development 
of the free-market price without CO2 regulation, will result in a lower BAU price 
than the BAU prices of a basic model with increasing gas prices and without CO2 
regulation. It should be noted that, although the BAU scenario with an increasing gas 
price will result in a steadily higher free-market marginal cost than the BAU scenario 
without a gas price increase, the difference gradually diminishes because, by the end 
of the period under review, the basic model with an unchanged gas price has a 
similar price level – only reached with a slower growth rate – to the model with an 
increasing gas price. 
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Figure 7. The trend of the free-market price of power in the case of increasing gas prices and 
unchanged import prices, as a consequence of different CO2 allowance prices  
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Figure 8. The trend of the free-market price of power in the case of increasing gas prices and 
import prices, as a consequence of different CO2 allowance prices  
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It is clear that up to a €5/t CO2 allowance price the price of imported power is 
dominant in our model, and only if the price of imported power grows does the free-
market price depart as a consequence of the introduction of CO2 regulation from the 
development of prices without regulation. In the case of an allowance price of €10/t 
the ‘carbon effect’ will be stronger and the free-market price will depart from the 
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price in effect without regulation even if import prices remain unchanged. Below a 
given CO2 cost level, then, the introduction of CO2 regulation itself will have a 
smaller impact on domestic power prices if imported power prices are stable – even 
if the gas prices are higher – than if the imported power prices start to rise following 
the introduction of CO2 regulation. This assumes not only that there will be a 
relatively substantial volume of imports, but also that, in the case of a CO2 allowance 
price of €3 or €5/t, the majority of domestic power plants can continue generating at 
unchanged cost levels. 
The following table presents the trend of annual consumption in the case of 
the model versions that assumed increasing gas prices. 
Table 8. Trend of annual net consumption in the case of increasing gas prices, at unchanged 
or growing import power prices and different CO2 allowance prices, GWh 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BAU 33710 34620 35525 36264 36977 37627 38199 38863 39510 40001 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 10108 12172 14224 16242 19988 23930 29915 30234 
In the case of unchanged import power price 
€3/t CO2  33710 34620 35525 36232 36921 37542 38132 38773 39392 39837 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 10108 12141 14168 16157 19920 23840 29798 30070 
€5/t CO2  33710 34620 35525 36213 36883 37509 38101 38743 39373 39822 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 10108 12121 14130 16123 19890 23810 29779 30055 
€10/t CO2  33710 34620 35521 36054 36614 37191 37764 38341 38828 39158 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 10104 11962 13861 15805 19553 23408 29233 29391 
In the case of growing  import power price 
€3/t CO2  33710 34620 35307 36014 36714 37256 37841 38484 39145 39633 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 9890 11923 13962 15870 19630 23551 29551 29866 
€5/t CO2  33710 34620 35307 35997 36686 37241 37831 38478 39143 39632 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 9890 11906 13933 15856 19620 23545 29548 29865 
€10/t CO2  33710 34620 35303 35870 36456 36984 37570 38172 38689 39042 
of which free 
market 6571 8531 9886 11778 13703 15598 19359 23239 29095 29275 
 
The growing importance of price elasticity is also evident here, as is the impact 
of price on consumption, where changes to the parameters of the model variables 
have smaller impacts than we saw in the case of the stable gas price models. 
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Figure 9. Trend in annual consumption in the case of increasing gas prices, unchanged 
import power prices and different CO2 allowance prices  
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Figure 10. Trend in annual consumption in the case of increasing gas prices,increasing 
import power prices and different CO2 allowance prices  
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Analysis of the above model versions shows that, for the power plants covered 
by the review, market share – market price and total CO2 emissions – is influenced 
primarily by the development of import power prices, rather than by the domestic 
price level of natural gas (at least if gas prices are assumed to be at the current level 
or at a level 15% higher). However, the effects of the price of gas should not be 
ignored. For a change in the gas price modifies the basic version without regulation 
(BAU) to such an extent that the introduction of CO2 regulation causes a smaller 
change in the price and in consumption in this case than the price change we see in 
the BAU versions when the 15% gas price increase is switched on and off. The 
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models with unchanged gas prices will thus result in lower prices growing at a 
slower rate, and consequently in a more rapid growth in consumption, but the 
differences will diminish towards the end of the period under review. 
The impact of the trend in the price of CO2 emission allowances on the 
secondary market will operate in a complex way, for the various versions of the 
model respond in different ways to the allowance prices. The following is a 
description of the perceptible relationships between our results and CO2 allowance 
prices. 
 
2.3 CO2 price sensitivity  
The following two figures show the trend in the free-market price, along with a €3/t 
and a €5/t CO2 allowance price. Some interesting factors are worth noting. The most 
important is that in the allowance price range between €3 and €5/t the results are not 
sensitive to change in the allowance price – the two figures are almost identical (the 
precise figures are listed in the previous section).  
Figure 11. Development of the free-market price of power in the two basic models, and in 
the versions modelling CO2 regulation involving a €3/t allowance price  
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Figure 12: Development of the free-market price of power in the two basic models, and in the 
versions modelling CO2 regulation involving a €5/t allowance price 
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This is related to the fact that, in the case of allowance prices falling between 
€3 and €5/t, the development of the price of power is determined by the price level 
of imported power and the gas price level rather than by the introduction of CO2 
regulation. This is indicated by the fact that the basic model involving an increasing 
gas price (BAU-gaz15) departs from the basic model with unchanged gas price 
(BAU-gaz0) and it follows the CO2 models involving increasing gas prices. By 
contrast, the model version with unchanged gas price and constant import price 
combined with CO2 regulation (gaz0-impall) provides results that are very similar to 
the basic model with unchanged gas prices (BAU-gaz0) both in the case of a €3/t and 
a €5/t allowance price.  
The third important comment is that, from 2011 on, the free-market prices will 
be identical, or at least very similar, in practically every model version. The reason 
for this is probably the scarcity of capacity, which will result in a similar price 
increase in the case of the €3 and the €5/t versions, and will slow the different rates 
of consumption growth in each version, leading to similar consumption levels by 
2011–2012. 
A €10/t allowance price will lead to results quite different from €3 or €5/t CO2 
allowance prices. The difference will be clear from a comparison of the following 
figure to the above two figures. 
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Figure 13. Development of the free-market price of power in the two basic models, and in the 
versions modelling CO2 regulation applying a €10/t allowance price  
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The first thing to notice is the marked divergence between the various model 
versions, quite unlike the situation in the case of lower allowance prices. The most 
interesting behaviour is displayed by the model that assumes a stable import power 
price and an unchanged gas price (gaz0-impall). In the case of a €3 or €5/t allowance 
price this does not depart substantially from the basic model with unchanged price, 
but here it results in slowly but steadily higher market prices, and by 2012 it 
practically converges with the rest of the models with CO2 regulation.  
Different behaviour is exhibited in the case of a €10/t allowance price by the 
model with growing gas price (BAU-gaz15); in the case of a €3 or €5/t allowance 
price, its results cannot be separated from those of the models with CO2 regulation. 
Accordingly, a €10/t allowance price seems to be a CO2 cost, in the case of which 
even the basic model with growing gas price will depart from the versions modelling 
CO2 regulation. Consequently, by the end of the period under review, the €10/t price 
does make a difference: the results based on CO2 regulation and those without CO2 
regulation will diverge from one another, and the later calculations all forecast 
higher power market prices than the earlier ones.  
2.4 The trend in CO2 emissions  
It should be noted that the total CO2 allowance allocated by the latest published 
version of the National Allocation Plan to the power plants covered by our review is 
substantially higher in each of the scenarios than the total CO2 emissions of the same 
power plants. The reason for this is complex and has come in for detailed analysis. 
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The CO2 allowances contained in the NAP are based on a forecast,12 the background 
studies and calculations for which come from the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and Water Management.13 A review of the calculations pertaining to 
power generators showed that the difference is explained by the following factors.  
The sectoral projection for 2005 referred to in the NAP corresponds, more or 
less, to the medium- and long-term capacity plan to be found on the home page of 
MAVIR.14 Our model contains the same capacity, utilisation and efficiency ratios as 
those published by MAVIR.15 However, using the data contained there, and given a 
similar trend in consumption, the estimated supply-side structure will differ to a 
greater or lesser extent from MAVIR’s supply structure for 2005.  
According to the results of our calculations the largest difference is to be 
found in the import of power, which is always much higher in our models than in 
the sectoral projection referred to in the NAP. Consequently, according to the results 
of our models, domestic generation will be lower in the case of the same gross 
consumption, i.e. the total CO2 emission will also be smaller. 
The other main difference is the quantity of power bought up on a mandatory 
basis, of which our model also assumes large quantities. The compulsory power 
purchase applies to power generators or generation technologies to which preference 
is given under the relevant legal regulations (Power Act No. 2001/CX, Decree 
56/2002 GKM). Most of the facilities concerned are power plants that generate power 
using renewable energy sources or are cogeneration plants. In our model the power 
generated by these is the quantity estimated by the current version of the relevant 
ministerial decree16 and is substantially higher than the estimate contained in the 
NAP projection. This will also result in lower output among the large power plants 
covered by our review in the case of the same gross consumption level, for the larger 
quantity of power purchased on a mandatory basis will reduce the output of the 
other plants. At the same time, this could mean some tension between sectors I/a 
and I/b of the NAP (and to a lesser extent also between sectors I/a and I/c) if the 
results of our modelling hold, for large power plants may generate less and small 
power plants may generate more power than would be indicated by the distribution 
of the allowances. 
Based on the above factors in the model versions where the introduction of 
CO2 regulation increases the price of imported electricity, the difference between the 
                                                 
12 NAP section 8: Sectoral establishment of emission units.  
13 www.kvvm.hu/szakmai/klima  
14 Medium- and long-term supply-side capacity plan of the power system – Download, Annexes. 
www.mavir.hu  
15 Another source of data in addition to the MAVIR Mellékletek [annexes] file: Villamos energia 
statisztikai évkönyv [Power industry statistics year book], 2001, 2002. 
16 Decree 56/2002 GKM on the rules of the purchase of power under compulsory power purchase and 
on the establishment of the prices applied; 17 July 2004; 30 December 2004. 
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CO2 allowance quantities allocated free of charge in the NAP and the total quantity 
resulting from our calculations is smaller than in the versions with unchanged 
import prices. According to our own results, in the versions involving constant 
import prices a larger scale of power import may be expected, which will increase the 
difference between the actual CO2 emissions of Hungarian power plants covered by 
our review and the quantity of CO2 allowances allocated to them free of charge. 
 
Figure 14. CO2 emissions in the model versions with €5/t and the total quota quantity 
allocated in the NAP, kt 
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Three components of this over-allocation have been identified. The import, 
which we estimated at a substantially higher level, and the ‘other’ output – not 
falling in sector I/a – which is also estimated higher, do not fully explain the whole 
of the difference between the allocated quotas and the total CO2 emission. In the 
various versions there is no explanation for at least 1–1.5 million tonnes of allowance 
surplus. 
It should be noted that emissions in the BAU model with unchanged gas price 
approximate and then exceed emissions under the BAU model with a changing gas 
price by the end of the period under review. The reason for this is that in the scenario 
with an unchanged gas price there are fewer imports than in the case of the higher 
gas price, where the more expensive natural gas makes Hungarian generators less 
competitive than imported power;  this will appear in increased imports as a result of 
the opening-up of the market. 
allocated quota
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The degree of over-allocation is presented in the case of the €3/t and the €10/t 
allowance prices as well. The following two figures show the impacts of the different 
CO2 allowance prices on the development of emission levels. 
 
Figure 15. The trend in total CO2 emissions of the power plants under review in the case of 
unchanged gas prices and different CO2 allowance prices, kt 
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The over-allocation identified in the case of the €5/t allowance price is also 
observed in the case of the €3 and the €10/t CO2 allowance price and in the case of 
unchanged gas price. Not just in the initial year, but throughout the period under 
review the total quantity of free allowances to be allocated under the NAP to the 
power plants covered by our study will substantially exceed the total emissions of 
the same group of power plants. The reason in each case is the development of 
imports and the output of the ‘other’ power plants, but some 1 million tonnes of 
allowances cannot be explained even by these two factors. 
Given the market effects described earlier, regulation seems to have little 
impact on the free-market prices in the case of a €3 or €5/t allowance price and the 
quantities do not differ from one another in several model versions vis-à-vis the basic 
case without regulation. The above figure clearly shows that this applies only to the 
market effects, for total CO2 emissions in the basic case without regulation 
significantly exceed the total CO2 emission in the versions modelled with the €3 and 
the €5/t allowance price. In the case of the versions with the €3 and the €5/t prices, 
the emission path will not differ materially and by the end of the term the same total 
emissions will be reached.  
allocated quota
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The two versions with a €10/t price clearly differ from the above, since both 
the emission path and the stabilising total emissions level will be much lower than in 
the other versions. It is, therefore, an interesting lesson that, in the case of the €3 or 
the €5/t allowance price, the total supply-side CO2 emissions of the power supply 
system will decline in such a way as will cause no material price increase or 
consumption decrease in the free-market segment in the majority of the model 
versions. 
 
Figure 16. The trend in total CO2 emissions of the power plants under review along with 
increasing gas prices and different CO2 allowance prices, 1kt 
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Over-allocation is also observed in the case of the models that involve growing 
gas prices. The excessive quantity of allowances is explained, according to our 
calculations, by three components again, two of which are evident – the 
underestimation of the share of imports and the output of ‘other’ power plants on the 
supply side – while the third component is not explicable by the authors’ model 
assumptions. Our emission results seem to be robust, since the three different 
emission paths and equilibrium emission levels appear equally clearly in the case of 
growing gas prices as well, and the results based on €3/t and €5/t are also quite 
closely aligned – unlike the models with unchanged gas prices – and this cluster is 
definitely lower than for emissions without regulation and higher than for emissions 
resulting from the application of a €10/t allowance price. 
all cated quota
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2.5 The possible revenue to the state 
Finally, it should be noted that the ‘allocated quantity of allowances’ in the above 
figures shows the allowances allocated free of charge, i.e. the total quantity of 
allowances established for the power plants under review, net of a 2.5% share to be 
auctioned. This means that, in addition to the quantity to be allocated by the state 
free of charge, a total of 373 kt of CO2 allowances may be sold on the European 
allowances market,17 from which an annual revenue of HUF 280, 467 or 934 million 
may be earned in the case of an allowance price of €3, €5 or €10/t respectively, over a 
three year period (in 2005, 2006 and 2007). 
Another source of state revenue could be the auctioning of the excess 
allowance that makes up the ‘over-allocation’. This would involve different 
quantities under the different scenarios. The following table shows the state revenues 
that could be earned each year by selling the over-allocation surplus in the case of 
one of the most likely model versions (5€-gaz15impall) and the over-allocation 
surplus in the case of the highest initial emissions (with the smallest over-allocation) 
(5€-gaz0imfut). 
 
Table 9. Possible state revenues from the sale of the surplus CO2 emission allowances, HUF 
million/year  
 CO2 
allowance  
State revenue that may be achieved in 
the case of different allowance prices, 
HUF million/year  
 tonnes €3 €5 €10 
2.5% auction 373474 280 467 934 
5€-gaz15impall 4365695 3274 5457 10914 
5€-gaz0imfut 2898770 2174 3623 7247 
 
If surplus allowances are sold, the buyers will probably come – rather than 
from the domestic power plants under review – from among those enterprises in the 
EU member states (through intermediaries) whose total allowance quantities are 
smaller than their CO2 emissions and whose marginal CO2 emission abatement costs 
exceed the equilibrium price that will prevail in the market of CO2 emission 
allowances.  
                                                 
17 ‘Pursuant to Article 10 of the Directive, 2.5% of the total emission units that may be allocated will be 
auctioned. The resulting revenue will be used by the budget for activities relating to emission 
abatement and for the supporting of renewable energy sources’ (NAP, section 7). 
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